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Over the last decade developmental researchers have shown increasing interest in the
emotions of guilt and shame in children. Most of the early work in this area was directed
at children’s understanding of one or both of these emotions (Ferguson, Stegge, &
Damhuis, 1991; Graham, Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984; Harris, 1989; Nunner-Winkler
& Sodian, 1988), but in recent years attempts have also been made to study children’s
actual feelings of guilt and/or shame (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Lake, Lane, & Harris,
1995; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Williams & Bybee, 1994; Zahn-Waxler,
Kochanska, Krupnick, & McNew, 1990). Much of this recent work is aimed at detecting
individual differences in children’s proneness to experience these emotions, which is seen
as a potential precursor of later emotional pathology.
A key issue in the above research is how to differentiate between guilt and shame. This
has become especially important since a controversy has arisen concerning the adaptive
value of both emotions. Some researchers have interpreted the available evidence as
indicating that guilt is an adaptive and pro-social emotion and that being guilt-prone
reects an adaptive and pro-social orientation, whereas shame is maladaptive and being
shame-prone provides a serious risk for later emotional pathology (Tangney et al., 1995).
Against this view it has been argued that both shame and guilt are to some extent
adaptive and that an excess of each can be maladaptive (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Harder,
1995). Obviously, to solve this issue empirically, separate measures of guilt-proneness
and shame-proneness are needed that can be related to indices of psychosocial functioning
and psychopathology.
A straightforward way to assess children’s proneness to feel guilty or ashamed would be
simply to ask them how often in their daily lives they feel guilty or ashamed. However,
such an approach is open to criticism for at least two reasons. The rst is that the
situational context in which these emotions arise is not taken into account; the second is
that it is unclear whether children are sufciently aware of the difference in meaning
between the terms of emotion ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’ to be able to distinguish between these
actual emotions when asked questions about them. Both problems have prompted
researchers to look for alternative measurement strategies and the general aim of the
present study to examine empirically the validity of the assumptions underlying these
alternative strategies when measuring shame and guilt in children.
To take the situational context into account, most researchers have adopted a scenario-
based approach in which participants are rst asked to imagine themselves being in one
of several different potentially shame- and/or guilt-eliciting situations and then to
indicate how they would feel. Given the currently prevailing view that any norm-
violating event will elicit guilt when the person’s evaluations are focused on his or her
own behaviour, and shame when they are focused on the person as a whole (Tangney,
1995), situations have been used that are likely to elicit both guilt and shame. These
situations usually depict a perpetrator who bears some responsibility for harming
someone, in that the harm could have been avoided even though it was not intentionally
caused.
One problematic consequence of using the same situations to elicit both guilt and
shame is that relatively strong correlations between the resulting measures of shame- and
guilt-proneness are likely to result. In fact, reported correlations between both types of
measures range from .40 to over .60 (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Harder, 1995; Tangney,
1995). This is especially undesirable if one aims to nd differential relations of both
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emotions with indices of social functioning and psychopathology. As a remedy, statistical
methods have been used to distinguish the relations of shame-proneness with various
indices of social functioning and psychopathology from those of guilt-proneness with
these indices (Tangney et al., 1995), but this approach has been criticized on methodo-
logical grounds (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998).
Less strongly interrelated measures of shame- and guilt-proneness might be obtained if
such measures could be based on situations that are specically designed to tap
participants’ tendency to experience one or other of these emotions, rather than both.
However, designing such situations requires a theoretical formulation of the distinction
between shame- and guilt-eliciting situations. Since early attempts in this respect have
not been successful, present-day theorists have downplayed the role of different situa-
tional antecedents in favour of the role of the individual’s self-directed negative
evaluations (Tangney, 1992).
Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly found that some events are far more likely to elicit
shame rather than guilt, whereas other events elicit both shame and guilt (Ferguson et al.,
1991; Tangney, 1992). To the present authors, this suggests that whether an event elicits
shame or guilt not only depends on the focus of the individual’s self-directed negative
evaluations, but also on characteristics of the event.
The present study is guided by the assumption that two separate dimensions underlie
the shame- and guilt-eliciting nature of events. It is assumed that people experience
feelings of guilt when they think that they have violated a moral rule, the most important
of these being that one should not cause harm or some other disadvantage to anyone (cf.
Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).
Shame, in contrast, does not depend on the moral relevance of an event. In line with the
analysis of Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, and Mascolo (1995), it is assumed here that the key
elicitor of shame is an unwanted identity. Lindsay-Hartz et al. take this to imply that
shame results from realizing that one is what one does not want to be. Since it has been
found that shameful persons are especially bothered by what important other persons
might think about them (Ferguson et al., 1991), the present authors prefer to dene an
unwanted identity in terms of what one thinks about what other persons might think
about the self. Accordingly, in our view shame results from one’s suspicion that important
other persons might consider one to be what one does not want to be.
This implies that virtually any behaviour or characteristic can, in particular contexts,
elicit shame. Some behaviours and characteristics, however, yield an unwanted identity in
many different contexts. A very important subset of unwanted, and therefore shame-
eliciting, identities results from not being able to exert sufcient control over one’s
behaviour (i.e. from behaving incoherently). Typically shame-eliciting behaviours that
yield this type of unwanted identity include excessive emotionality, clumsiness, etc.
Another type of incoherence includes breaking promises and not being able to conform to
standards that one has professed oneself.
Unwanted identities also result from behaviours revealing a person to be incompetent
in a particular domain. A lack of ability has been recognized repeatedly as eliciting shame
(Covington & Omelich, 1984; Weiner, 1985). In sum, any behaviour that leads people to
think that they have behaved incompetently or incoherently and that important other
persons might consider them to be incompetent or incoherent provokes shame.
When taken together, this analysis of guilt and shame implies that a distinction can be
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made between two types of situations. In the rst type, someone behaves incoherently
and/or incompetently without causing harm to anyone: such situations can be expected to
elicit shame rather than guilt and are therefore further referred to as ‘shame-only’
situations. In the second type, a person’s incoherent and/or incompetent behaviour does
cause harm to another person: such situations can be expected to elicit both shame and
guilt and are therefore further referred to as ‘shame-and-guilt’ situations.
The study’s rst aim is to test these ideas. Accordingly, respondents are asked to
imagine ve shame-only situations in which a protagonist risks an unwanted identity by
behaving incoherently and/or incompetently, but without causing harm to anyone. In
addition, ve shame-and-guilt situations are presented in which the protagonist also
behaves incoherently and/or incompetently, but in such a way that real or imagined harm
results for another person. Since the literature on responsibility-related antecedents of
feelings of guilt (Ferguson, Olthof, & Stegge, 1997; McGraw, 1987) indicates that guilt
not only results from intentionally caused harm, the present authors included both cases
of intentional harm and cases of unintentional, yet foreseeable, harm. Respondents used a
rating scale to indicate how guilty and how ashamed the protagonist would feel. In
accordance with the study’s aim of nding ways to improve on currently available
instruments for measuring guilt and shame-proneness, it was decided to use the same type
of stimulus material as is used in such instruments (i.e. imaginary situations; Ferguson &
Stegge, 1995, 1998; Tangney, 1995). On the basis of the above analysis, two predictions
can be made: rst, the shame-only situations should elicit higher ratings of shame than of
guilt, whereas this difference should be smaller or non-existent for the shame-and-guilt
situations; and secondly, the shame-only situations should elicit lower ratings of guilt
than the shame-and-guilt situations, whereas this difference should be smaller or non-
existent for ratings of shame.
The study’s second aim is to examine the development of children’s ability to
distinguish between the two types of situations described above. In a developmental
study, Harris, Olthof, Meerum Terwogt, and Hardman (1987) asked 5–14-year-old
English and Dutch children to describe situations in which people would feel guilty and
situations in which they would feel ashamed. Although Harris et al. did not carry out a
detailed analysis of the nature of the situations that children generated, their analytical
procedures nevertheless enabled them to conclude that 5-year-olds were unable to
describe situations that were recognizable by adult judges as elicitors of either shame or
guilt, but that English 7-year-olds and 11-year-olds from both countries were able to do
so. These ndings indicate that 6–11-year-old children are increasingly able to dis-
tinguish between the emotions of shame and guilt in terms of the situations that elicit
them.
When combined with the above analysis, the ndings of Harris et al. can be taken to
imply that 6–11-year-old children increasingly consider situations in which someone
behaves incoherently and/or incompetently without causing harm to anyone as elicitors of
shame rather than guilt; whereas they consider situations in which the protagonist’s
incoherent and/or incompetent behaviour does cause harm as elicitors of both shame and
guilt. To test this hypothesis, the situations described above are presented to a group of
6-year-olds and a group of 11-year-olds. In the developmental literature the age of 9 has
been identied as the age at which children’s reports about guilt and shame start to
approximate those of adults (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995). A group of 9-year-olds was
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therefore also included in this study. It is predicted that the 9- and 11-year-olds’ ratings
will be more consistent with the rst two predictions than those of the 6-year-olds.
Earlier, this study identied a further problem with simply asking children how often
they feel guilty or ashamed (i.e. that children might be insufciently aware of the
differential meaning of the emotion terms ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’). The use of these terms has
been criticized on the grounds that even adults are unaware of the differences between
them (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Tangney, 1995). Therefore, most researchers have used
indirect questions with both adults and children. That is, respondents are asked to
indicate to what extent they would experience particular experiential correlates of each
emotion (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Harder, 1995; Tangney et al., 1995). In this indirect
strategy, guilt is indicated by prosocial responses such as wanting to make an excuse or
thinking about how to repair any damage that one has caused. Shame is indicated by
thoughts about hiding oneself or about how bad one is as a person.
This solution to the dependent measure problem is itself not necessarily without
problems, especially when the participants are children. One disadvantage of asking
participants whether a particular shame- or guilt-related experience would occur is that
there need not be a one-to-one correspondence between the particular experiential
correlate that is referred to in the question and the target emotion. Moreover, the strength
of such links might vary with age. For example, whereas one child, who imagines feeling
guilty after having unintentionally made a dent in his father’s car, might agree that he
would think about how to restore the relationship with his father, another child might
disagree, because her feelings of guilt elicit thoughts of a particular strategy to repair the
damage, for example by beating out the dent herself. The general point is that a
respondent’s denial that a particular guilt- or shame-related thought or feeling or
behaviour is likely to occur does not necessarily imply that he or she does not feel guilty
or ashamed. The denial might also indicate that the respondent considers other guilt- or
shame-related thoughts, feelings or behaviours more likely.
At the same time, claims of a lack of knowledge of the meaning of the emotion terms
‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ notwithstanding, there is evidence that even children are to some
extent able to distinguish between them. Specically, Harris et al.’s (1987) use of these
terms did not prevent children aged 7 and upward from describing situations that adults
could recognize as elicitors of either shame or guilt. Similarly, Ferguson et al. (1991)
found that 11-year-old children associated the terms ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’ with different
situational antecedents and with different reasons for experiencing the emotion. In a
second study, these authors found that even younger children differentially associated the
terms ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’ with statements about the reasons, meaning, and expressional,
experiential and action tendency aspects of these emotions.
In sum, although most researchers have preferred to use respondents’ ratings of the
intensity of several experiential correlates of guilt and shame, it is not clear whether such
ratings actually provide a better index of children’s emotional responses than ratings
employing the terms themselves. Accordingly, the third aim of the present study is to
examine which type of ratings yields children’s best performance in terms of differ-
entiating shame-only situations from shame-and-guilt situations, and in terms of
responding differentially to questions about guilt vs. shame.
To this end, children rated the intensity of the protagonist’s shame and guilt in the
shame-only and in the shame-and-guilt situations in two different ways. That is, they
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gave ratings of both emotions based on the emotion terms and they also gave ratings based
on particular experiential correlates of each emotion. Both types of ratings are compared
in terms of how far the results are consistent with the theoretically-based predictions
articulated above.
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 children from two schools in two small towns near Utrecht, in the Netherlands. These
children were drawn from the participants in a larger project aimed at identifying the antecedents of
individual differences in shame- and guilt-proneness. Children came from families of mixed socio-
economic backgrounds. They were divided into three age groups: 6-year-olds (8 boys and 8 girls, M = 6
years 9 months, SD = 5 months); 9-year-olds (8 boys and 8 girls, M = 9 years 3 months, SD = 6 months)
and 11-year-olds (8 boys and 8 girls, M = 11 years 2 months, SD = 5 months).
Procedure and dependent measures
Children were tested individually by one of three female experimenters in a quiet room at their own school.
Testing began by training children to use a 5-point scale to be used later in the procedure. Subsequently,
children gave their shame and guilt ratings in response to each of the shame- and/or guilt-eliciting
situations.
Scale training. The rating scale consisted of ve size-graduated vertical rectangles of a bright blue colour
that were drawn on a white piece of paper. The 6-year-olds received an elaborate training in how to use the
scale. The experimenter began the training by pointing to each rectangle and verbalizing the appropriate
label (not at all; a little bit; quite a bit; a lot; very, very much). The experimenter then explained how the
scale could be used, using as an example how scary different animals were (the animals used were lambs,
mice, big dogs, lions and crocodiles). To check scale comprehension, children were asked to rate how
strong several persons were (including a giant, a policeman, a father, a big child, an old lady, a small child
and a baby). Since the same procedure has been used successfully in previous research with even younger
children (Olthof & Engelberts-Vaske, 1997), children were not expected to have difculties using the scale
and this expectation was borne out by their responses to the strength question. The 9- and 11-year-olds
received a shorter version of the scale training.
Guilt and shame judgments. The experimenter successively described the 10 situations employed.1 Each
situation featured a protagonist of the same sex as the child. There were additional minor differences
between the boys’ and the girls’ versions of the situation descriptions (e.g. when reference was made to
boys’ vs. girls’ toys). Translated versions of the original Dutch-language situation descriptions are
presented in the Appendix.
All situations were presented in a xed random order in a single session of about 20 min. After
describing a situation, the experimenter rst asked the term-based and correlate-based shame questions
and then the term-based and correlate-based guilt questions. The term-based questions were: ‘How much
did [protagonist’s name] feel ashamed (guilty)? Didn’t she (he) feel ashamed (guilty) at all, did she (he) feel
ashamed (guilty) a little bit, quite a bit, a lot, or very, very much?’ When asking these questions, the
experimenter pointed to the appropriate rectangles of the scale. In the correlate-based questions, the child
was asked to use the same rating scale to indicate to what extent the protagonist would experience a
particular experiential correlate of shame (guilt) that was specically tailored for that situation. All
correlates are listed in the Appendix, together with the corresponding situations.
1 In fact, another four situations were included that were aimed to explore the shame- and guilt-eliciting
characteristics of certain types of illness-related behaviour. Since children’s responses to these situations are
only tangentially relevant to the purposes of this study, they are not reported here.
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Results
Differentiating shame from guilt in the two types of situations
The term-based and correlate-based ratings were averaged across the ve shame-only
situations and across the ve shame-and-guilt situations. As a check on whether both
categories of situations were sufciently homogeneous to justify combining them, the
analyses with the averaged term-based ratings, reported below, were paralleled by two
sets of ve additional analyses. In the rst set, the authors successively replaced the term-
based shame-only average by the term-based ratings of each of the ve shame-only
situations. In the second set, the term-based guilt-and-shame average was successively
replaced by the term-based ratings of each of the ve guilt-and-shame situations.
Subsequently, the equivalent analyses were also carried out for the correlate-based
ratings.
Even though the ve analyses within each set usually differed somewhat in terms of
whether particular effects were or were not signicant, the interaction effects that were
particularly relevant for the purposes of this study were generally found to be quite similar
within each set. (These results can be obtained from the rst author.) These results were
taken to indicate that the situations within the shame-only and guilt-and-shame
categories were sufciently homogeneous to justify combining them. These averaged
ratings are further used in this study.
Further preliminary analyses with the averaged ratings revealed that although there
were some effects of gender on children’s ratings, the inclusion of gender did not qualify
any of the conclusions that could be derived from analyses without gender. Therefore, to
save space, gender is ignored in analyses below.
First tested were the predictions that (1) the shame-only situations would elicit higher
ratings of shame than of guilt, (2) the shame-only situations would elicit lower ratings of
guilt than the shame-and-guilt situations, and (3) the eldest children’s ratings would
better conrm the rst two predictions than those of younger children. This was done by
carrying out two separate 3 (Age) 3 2 (Type of Situation = shame-only vs. shame-and-
guilt) 3 2 (Type of Judgment = shame vs. guilt) mixed-design analyses of variance on
children’s term-based ratings and on their correlate-based ratings. Note that the rst two
predictions imply a signicant Type of Situation 3 Type of Judgment interaction and
that the third prediction implies a signicant three-way interaction of Age 3 Type of
Situation 3 Type of Judgment.
In addition to signicant Type of Situation and Type of Judgment main effects, the
predicted Type of Situation 3 Type of Judgment interaction was in fact signicant in
both analyses. The means and the Fs representing these effects are presented in the upper
panel of Table 1 for the term-based ratings, and in the upper panel of Table 2 for the
correlate-based ratings. To examine further whether the Type of Situation 3 Type of
Judgment interactions reect the predicted differences, two additional one-factor within-
subjects analyses of variance were carried out. In the rst of these analyses, children’s guilt
and shame ratings for the shame-only situations were compared. The results are indicated
in Tables 1 and 2 by whether the corresponding means do or do not share an identical
superscript. The results of the second analysis, in which children’s guilt ratings for the
shame-only situations were compared to their guilt ratings for the shame-and-guilt
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situations, are indicated by whether the corresponding means in Tables 1 and 2 do or do
not share an identical subscript.
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 (upper panels), the rst two predictions were
conrmed. The shame-only situations elicited higher ratings of shame than of guilt, and
children’s ratings of guilt were lower in the shame-only situations than in the shame-and-
guilt situations. This pattern occurred irrespective of whether the ratings were
term-based (see Table 1) or correlate-based (see Table 2).
In both analyses, the main effect of Age was also signicant (Fs(2,45) for the term-
based vs. correlate-based ratings were 8.78, p = .001 vs. 11.32, p < .001, respectively) and
the same was true for the Age 3 Type of Situation 3 Type of Judgment interaction (Fs
for the term-based vs. correlate-based ratings were 6.19, p < .01 vs. 12.93, p < .001,
respectively). The mean term-based and correlate-based ratings representing the Age 3
Type of Situation 3 Type of Judgment interactions are presented in the lower panels of
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. To analyse these interactions further, separate 2 (Type of
Situation) 3 2 (Type of Judgment) fully within-participants analyses of variance were
carried out for each age group’s term-based and correlate-based ratings separately. The
results of these analyses are presented in the right-hand columns of the lower panels of
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1. Means and ANOVA results representing interactions of Type of Situation (TS)
3 Type of Judgment (TJ) (upper panel) and of Age 3 Type of Situation 3 Type of
Judgment (lower panels) in children’s term-based ratings
Type of judgment Analyses of variance
Type of situation Shame Guilt Effect F p
All ages
Shame-only 3.85b (.75) 2.85ac (.85) TS 13.98 .001
Shame-and-guilt 3.89 (.77) 3.36d (.63) TJ 110.48 .001
TS 3 TJ 17.45 .001
Age 6
Shame-only 4.09b (.54) 3.23ac (.75) TS 0.70 n.s.
Shame-and-guilt 4.23 (.72) 3.30c (.64) TJ 30.58 .001
TS 3 TJ 0.08 n.s.
Age 9
Shame-only 4.00b (.81) 3.13ac (.73) TS 6.69 .05
Shame-and-guilt 4.03 (.66) 3.75d (.52) TJ 24.57 .001
TS 3 TJ 12.56 .01
Age 11
Shame-only 3.46b (.75) 2.19ac (.68) TS 10.16 .01
Shame-and-guilt 3.43 (.73) 3.03d (.51) TJ 67.95 .001
TS 3 TJ 23.96 .001
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means within the ‘shame-only’ rows not sharing an identical superscript
and means within the ‘guilt’ columns not sharing an identical subscript differ signicantly.
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The predicted Type of Situation 3 Type of Judgment interaction was not yet evident
in the 6-year-olds’ term-based ratings (see Table 1, lower panel), but it emerged as a
marginally signicant effect in their correlate-based ratings (see Table 2, lower panel). For
the 9- and 11-year-olds the interaction was signicant, irrespective of whether the ratings
were term-based or correlate-based. As before, these interactions were examined further
for each age group separately by carrying out the two one-factor analyses described
above.
As can be seen in the lower panels of Tables 1 and 2, the results for the 9- and 11-year-
olds were fully consistent with the predictions. For these age groups, the Type of Situation
3 Type of Judgment interaction was signicant, the shame-only situations elicited
higher ratings of shame than of guilt, and ratings of guilt were lower for the shame-only
situations than for the shame-and-guilt situations.
The 6-year-old children’s term-based ratings failed to show a signicant Type of
Situation 3 Type of Judgment interaction and these children also failed to distinguish
between both types of situations when rating guilt. The predicted interaction did
approach signicance in the 6-year-olds’ correlate-based ratings, but there they failed to
give higher ratings of shame than of guilt for the shame-only situations. In sum, the
results for the 6-year-olds were not fully consistent with the rst two predictions, which
is consistent with the third prediction.
Table 2. Means and ANOVA results representing interactions of Type of Situation (TS)
3 Type of Judgment (TJ) (upper panel) and of Age 3 Type of Situation 3 Type of
Judgment (lower panels) in children’s correlate-based ratings
Type of judgment Analyses of variance
Type of situation Shame Guilt Effect F p
All ages
Shame-only 3.23b (.82) 2.81ac (.72) TS 9.80 .01
Shame-and-guilt 2.92 (.85) 3.67d (.68) TJ 4.77 .05
TS 3 TJ 110.02 .001
Age 6
Shame-only 3.14a (.79) 3.19ac (.58) TS 1.81 n.s.
Shame-and-guilt 3.18 (.87) 3.61d (.65) TJ 3.16 .10
TS 3 TJ 4.12 .06
Age 9
Shame-only 3.59b (.88) 3.03ac (.68) TS 10.78 .01
Shame-and-guilt 3.36 (.69) 4.09d (.48) TJ 0.57 n.s.
TS 3 TJ 39.48 .001
Age 11
Shame-only 2.96b (.69) 2.23ac (.51) TS 1.50 n.s.
Shame-and-guilt 2.21 (.48) 3.30d (.67)s TJ 1.57 n.s.
TS 3 TJ 75.77 .001
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means within the ‘shame-only’ rows not sharing an identical superscript
and means within the ‘guilt’ columns not sharing an identical subscript differ signicantly.
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Discussion
The study’s rst aim was to examine whether children would attribute guilt specically
to persons who have caused harm to other persons, while attributing shame to any person
who behaves incoherently and/or incompetently. As was clear from the analyses of
variance, both the 9- and 11-year-olds’ judgments were consistent with the predictions.
That is, these children attributed more shame than guilt to protagonists in shame-only
situations, and they attributed more guilt to protagonists in shame-and-guilt situations
than to protagonists in the shame-only situations.
These ndings indicate that situations that elicit shame rather than guilt can be
distinguished from situations that elicit both shame and guilt. As such, they provide
partial support for the assumption that two separate dimensions underlie the shame- and
guilt-eliciting nature of events. Obviously, a full test of this idea would also require the
use of situations that would elicit guilt rather than shame. However, performing such a
test is difcult, since violating a moral rule by, for example, causing harm to someone can
also very easily elicit thoughts that one might be seen as a clumsy person or as someone
who is unable to restrain one’s anger. By far the most guilt-eliciting events can therefore
be expected to elicit shame as well. However, the analysis implies that there should
nevertheless exist ‘guilt-only’ situations that involve causing harm to someone, but
without implying an unwanted identity. In fact, one of the authors recently found that
cases in which a protagonist’s illness causes trouble for other persons might constitute
such situations (Olthof, Bloemers, Deij, & Ferguson, 1998).
The second aim was to examine the development of children’s ability to distinguish
between shame-only and shame-and-guilt situations when giving ratings of shame and
guilt. As was clear from the interactions with Age, the 6-year-olds did not make the
relevant distinctions as clearly as the 9- and 11-year-olds. This nding supports the
hypothesis that there is an age-related increase in children’s ability to associate situations
in which someone behaves incoherently and/or incompetently without causing harm to
anyone with the feeling of shame and to associate situations in which the protagonist’s
incompetent and/or incoherent behaviour does cause harm with feelings of shame and
guilt.
The third aim was to examine whether the term-based or the correlate-based ratings
would yield children’s best performance in terms of differentiating between judgments of
shame vs. guilt for shame-only situations, and in terms of differentiating shame-only
situations from shame-and-guilt situations when giving ratings of guilt. As is clear from
the pattern of signicant effects in Tables 1 and 2, there was no clear difference between
the two types of measure in terms of conformity of children’s ratings to the predictions.
Accordingly, the results do not provide a direct basis for arguing that either term-based
or correlate-based ratings are preferable in research with children. However, some aspects
of the use of correlate-based ratings in this study and of the results that were obtained
deserve further discussion.
A general problem with the correlate-based results is that any conclusion based on
them can be criticized on the grounds that the particular choice of correlates has been
unfortunate. For example, in the present context it could reasonably be argued that the
guilt correlates used in the shame-only situations were not very plausible and that more
plausible alternatives could have been used. It is not thought, however, that this had
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much effect on children’s ratings. Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that children’s
term-based ratings of guilt for the shame-only situations were as low as their correlate-
based ratings for these same situations. This suggests that children did not so much
consider the particular correlates to be implausible, but that they rather considered the
occurrence of guilt in the shame-only situations to be implausible.
Similarly, it could be argued that the choice of shame correlates in the shame-and-guilt
and the shame-only situations was unfortunate in that they were not quite comparable.
Specically, whereas most of the shame-only situations included blushing as the shame
correlate, which could be seen as reecting fairly mild forms of shame, most of the shame-
and-guilt situations included socially undesirable shame correlates like wanting to hide
behind one’s mother or thinking that one is not liked by other children. In support of this
criticism, it could further be argued that it explains a surprising aspect of the 11-year-
olds’ ratings (i.e. that these children’s correlate-based ratings of shame were considerably
lower for the shame-and-guilt situations than for the shame-only situations, whereas the
corresponding difference did not exist for their term-based ratings).
Fortunately, there is an empirical way to examine the effects of the use of different
shame correlates in the shame-only vs. shame-and-guilt situations, because even for the
shame-and-guilt situations blushing was used once as the shame-correlate (i.e. in
situation SAG–2), and even for the shame-only situations the thought of being disliked
was used once as the shame-correlate (i.e. in situation SO–5). Accordingly, to compare the
11-year-olds’ correlate-based shame ratings for the four shame-only situations that
included blushing as the shame correlate with the ratings for the one shame-and-guilt
situation (SAG–2) that also included blushing as the shame correlate, an additional
analysis of variance was carried out with Type of Situation (the four shame-only situations
vs. the one shame-and-guilt situation) as the only within-participants factor. This analysis
yielded a signicant effect of Type of Situation (F(1,15) = 33.45, p < .001), with the
means for the shame-only vs. shame-and-guilt situations being 2.95 vs. 1.89, respec-
tively. A complementary analysis that compared the same children’s correlate-based
shame ratings for the one shame-only situation that included the thought of not being
liked as the shame correlate (i.e. SO–5) with those for the four shame-and-guilt situations
that included similarly socially undesirable shame correlates also yielded a signicant
effect of Type of Situation (F(1,15) = 6.00, p < .05), with the means for the shame-only vs.
shame-and-guilt situations being 3.00 vs. 2.30, respectively.
Accordingly, even when similar shame correlates were employed in each type of
situation, children’s correlate-based ratings were still lower for the shame-and-guilt
situations than for the shame-only situations. This suggests that the results obtained with
the shame correlates in this study cannot be explained in terms of the specic nature of the
correlates that were used.
The introductory text above discusses a potential problem of using correlates (i.e. that
a respondent might deny that a particular guilt- or shame-correlate is likely to occur
because he or she considers a different correlate more likely and not because he or she
imagines not feeling guilty or ashamed). Even though children did not perform worse
when giving correlate-based ratings than when giving term-based ratings, two aspects of
the data nevertheless suggest that the use of correlate-based ratings might lead one to
underestimate the intensity of respondents’ imagined emotions.
The rst concerns the 11-year-olds’ relatively low correlate-based ratings of shame for
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the shame-and-guilt situations. These ratings might reect the fact that, unlike the term
‘shame’, the shame correlates in the shame-and-guilt situations had no bearing on
morality, whereas children did perceive these situations as morally relevant. Such a partial
mismatch between the correlates and the situations may have led them to lower their
ratings. A second indication that correlates possibly are too specic to warrant using them
as substitutes for the emotional terms themselves is that children’s correlate-based ratings
of shame were generally lower than the corresponding term-based ratings (see Tables 1
and 2).
Altogether, these ndings are inconsistent with a common assumption in the shame-
and guilt-proneness literature (i.e. that correlate-based questions are preferable to term-
based questions). The data indicate that from the age of 9 upward, children are perfectly
well able to differentiate shame from guilt, even when giving term-based judgments. As
such, these ndings conrm earlier ndings in the developmental literature (Ferguson et
al. 1991; Harris et al. 1987) that children from mid-school age onwards already have
considerable knowledge of the meaning of the terms ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’. Given the
disadvantages of correlate-based judgments and the good performance of participants
from about the age of 9 onwards when giving term-based judgments, researchers should
seriously consider the use of term-based judgments in addition to, or instead of, correlate-
based judgments.
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Appendix: The three types of situations used, together with corresponding
experiential correlates for shame and for guilt
Shame-and-guilt (SAG) situations
SAG–1. Marco has a friend. All the children in the class like that friend very much. He is always invited
to other children’s birthday parties. Marco is a bit jealous and during break he says nasty things about his
friend. The next day, no-one wants to play with Marco’s friend anymore and he is very sad. (Shame
correlate: Marco thinks: ‘I am not a nice friend at all’; Guilt correlate: Marco thinks: ‘It’s my fault that
nobody likes my friend anymore’.)
SAG–2. Tommy and his mother are sitting round the table. Tommy drinks his juice and his mother is
writing a letter. Then Tommy calls for the cat and the cat jumps on to the table, knocking over Tommy’s
glass. Tommy’s juice spills all over his mother’s letter. (Shame correlate: Tommy goes red in the face; Guilt
correlate: Tommy does his best to be nice to his mother.)
SAG–3. Job has a friend who can run very fast. One day his friend takes part in a race. Job is a bit jealous
of his friend. Job goes to see his friend in the race, but his friend loses. Job thinks: ‘Oh boy, I’m glad he
lost.’ Then Job sees that his friend is very sad. (Shame correlate: Job quickly looks the other way when his
friend approaches him. He can only look down at his feet when his friend stands next to him; Guilt
correlate: Job thinks: ‘It’s terrible that I was happy because my friend lost the race’.)
SAG–4. Cas is playing upstairs with a friend in his friend’s house. They are playing with his friend’s toy
car. Then Cas hears that his mother has come to fetch him. He rushes downstairs, but suddenly he hears:
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‘CRACK!’ Cas sees that he has stepped on his friend’s car. (Shame correlate: Cas would like to rush to his
mother and hide behind her back; Guilt correlate: All the time Cas is thinking about what he should do
to make it up to his friend.)
SAG–5. Today Pim is in a bad mood. At home he quarrels with everyone. At school he is also in a bad
mood. When a boy accidentally steps on Pim’s toes, Pim looses his temper and shouts out loud: ‘Hey, look
where you’re walking!’ The other boy is terried and everyone in the class looks at Pim. (Shame correlate:
Pim thinks that the other children in his class won’t like him anymore; Guilt correlate: Pim is sorry that
he shouted at the other boy.)
Shame-only (SO) situations
SO–1. Last night Erik did not sleep well. He is still very tired when he has to get up in the morning. At
school he is almost asleep. Then the teacher asks him a question. Erik is startled and he has no idea what
the question is about. (Shame correlate: Erik goes red in the face; Guilt correlate: Erik thinks: ‘I’m sorry
for the teacher that I almost fell asleep’.)
SO–2. Children in Rik’s class are having a reading lesson. Then it’s Rik’s turn to read. When he comes
to a difcult word, Rik doesn’t know how to pronounce it, but he does make a try. All the children start
laughing and Rik realizes that he has made a mistake pronouncing the word. (Shame correlate: Rik goes
red in the face; Guilt correlate: Rik thinks: ‘I might get punished for this’.)
SO–3. Tim is invited to a party where he doesn’t know many other children. All the children are given
a huge glass of Coca Cola. Tim is very thirsty and he quickly nishes his coke. Then suddenly he burps out
loud. (Shame correlate: Tim goes red in the face; Guilt correlate: Tim thinks: ‘How awful for the other
children. Why do I always drink so fast?’.)
SO–4. In the playground, Joost is talking with a girl from his class, called Nicolien. Then the other boys
from his class come along. One boy shouts: ‘Joost is in love, Joost is in love!’ All the children start laughing.
(Shame correlate: Joost goes red in the face; Guilt correlate: Joost thinks: ‘It must be terrible for Nicolien
to hear those boys say such things’.)
SO–5. In physical exercise class, the children from Bart’s group are going to play volleyball. The teacher
asks two boys to form a team by picking new team members in turn. In the end, everyone has been included
in a team, except Bart. He is the only one left over. (Shame correlate: Bart thinks: ‘There we are, they don’t
like me at all’; Guilt correlate: Bart feels sorry for the other children that he isn’t better at volleyball. He
is only a nuisance to them.)
Note. The situation descriptions were translated from the original Dutch.
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